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INTRODUCTION
For more than two decades a worldwide wave of reforms has been reshaping the land-
scape of infrastructure industries both in their market structure and in the institu-
tions that govern them. In developed countries, these reforms mainly sought to
improve industry performance by introducing competition in some selected segments
and redesigning the legal and regulatory framework so as to enhance diversification
and quality of service, efficiency, and pricing. Although based on the same funda-
mental principles, these reforms faced a significantly different context in developing
countries. Indeed, these countries were typically characterised by not only poor infra-
structures and weak economic conditions, but also, and more importantly, by severely
inadequate administrative rules at both the sectoral and economy-wide levels inher-
ited from the pre-reform era. An important methodological implication then is that
both regulatory governance within the sector and more global factors related to the
governance of the economy as a whole should be accounted for when evaluating the
performance of regulation in a given infrastructure sector. A first objective of this
paper is to discuss the relative weight of these sectoral and economy-wide factors in
the determination of regulatory performance.
Two streams of literature stand at the forefront when considering the determi-
nants of regulatory performance in infrastructure industries. A first empirical stream
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emphasises the impact of regulatory governance on performance. Cubbin and Stern,
(2005). Another stream, this time conceptual, argues that when investigating regula-
tory performance in infrastructure sectors the relevant topic to consider takes place
upstream at the (higher) level of politics. Spiller and Tommasi, (2003). Our general
view is that indeed the relationship between political and regulatory structures and
processes has to be given due attention when assessing regulatory performance. This
leads us to suggest an approach that merges the above two streams of literature by
assuming that political accountability is the fundamental factor through which the
economic institutions of a country impact the performance of sectoral regulatory
institutions. An econometric analysis of two data sets on the telecommunications
industry, one on developing countries and another on developed countries, allows us
to illustrate this link and to give some empirical substance to the presumption that
political accountability enhances regulatory performance, more so in developing
countries.
In addition to insufficient deployment of infrastructure and difficulties in the func-
tioning of institutions, developing countries are often characterised by poor macro-
economic conditions. Both the structure of the reforms, in terms of their number,
design and timing, and their impact on the performance of the infrastructure indus-
try, are subject to these constraints. Therefore, the market reform conjuncture is not
only conditioned by sectoral factors, but also by institutional and macroeconomic fac-
tors affecting the efficiency of institutional rules such as the corruption engrained in
the political system, and the financial situation often constrained in developing coun-
tries by, among other things, high debt services and inefficient taxation.
A second purpose of this paper is to explore both the impact of the sectoral
reforms on the deployment of infrastructure and the conditions that lead to specific
reforms and allow them to proliferate.
The impact of reforms on the deployment of infrastructure in developing countries
has largely been addressed by an empirical stream of literature.2 However, the deter-
minants of these reforms have been mainly explored at the theoretical level.3 There
is room then for bringing the lessons from this theoretical literature to the empirical
analysis of the role of reforms in the development of infrastructure in the developing
countries. By means of an econometric analysis of a data set on the telecommunica-
tions industry in developing countries, we explore the impact of sectoral reforms on
fixed-line deployment and discuss, in line with a series of theoretical hypotheses
derived from the literature, the role of the level of infrastructure deployment, the
institutional risk, and the cost of public funds in the decisions to introduce privatisa-
tion and competition and to create a separate regulator.
Cellular competition in the analogue and digital segments is separately analysed
and indeed, empirical evidence on the timing of its introduction and on its market
implications suggests such a separate analysis. An additional feature of the empiri-
cal analysis is that it emphasises the two-way causal relationship between sectoral
reforms and infrastructure deployment. Indeed, reforms are likely to be endogenous
3
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2 See Fink et al (2002) for an overview of this stream of literature.
3 See Auriol and Picard (2004), Warlters (2004), Laffont (2005), Emerson (2006), and Evans et al (2005).
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to deployment, particularly in the early stages of privatisation and competition
reforms.4 Moreover, the creation of a separate regulator may also depend on condi-
tions characterising the periods prior to the introduction of regulation.5
The plan of the paper is as follows. The next section describes the data sets and
the econometric methodologies used in our analysis. In Section 3 we first present the
empirical results on the role of political accountability in regulatory performance
with two data sets on the telecommunications industry in developing countries and
developed countries. We then discuss our empirical findings on the determinants of
sectoral reforms and on the impact of these reforms on the deployment of infra-
structure, with a data set on the telecommunications industry in developing coun-
tries. We conclude with a summary of our main findings and a discussion of some
policy implications.
DATA AND ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY
In this section, we give a brief account of the data and the econometric methodology
used to analyse empirically the role of political and economic institutions in the devel-
opment of the telecommunications sector in developing countries.
The first study concerning the impact of the quality of institutions on the per-
formance of regulation, Gasmi et al (2006) is based on a set of regressions performed
with two time-series-cross-sectional (TSCS) data samples, one containing informa-
tion on 29 developing countries and another on 23 developed countries, and both cov-
ering the period that runs from 1985 to 1999, the last year for which data were avail-
able on all the variables considered in the study. Table 1 below exhibits the list of these
variables and their designation.6
4
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4 For instance, licences are often granted conditional on the fulfilment of targets of penetration rates and quality and
associated with exclusivity periods.
5 Gutierrez (2003), Ros (1999, 2003) already point out the potential endogeneity of telecommunications reforms.
6 For a thorough description of the data and their sources, the reader is referred to Gasmi et al (2006).
01 institutionalDesign2.qxp  2009/03/17  02:45 PM  Page 4
TABLE 1: LIST OF VARIABLES AND DESIGNATION (Gasmi et al 2006)
In each of the regressions, the dependent variable measures regulatory perform-
ance. More specifically, regulatory performance is measured by a variable of output
(penetration rate of fixed-line telephone service or number of subscribers to cellular
service), efficiency (number of fixed-lines per employee), or price (the monthly sub-
scription to fixed telephone service for residential consumers or the price of a three-
minute cellular call during peak hours).
As to the explanatory variables, they include variables describing the standard
reform instruments, namely, privatisation (percentage of the incumbent fixed service
operator’s assets privatised) and competition (degree of competition in the fixed and
cellular segments), and some variables conveying general information on demand
(population density and percentage of population that is rural). For the purpose of
this paper, however, we focus on the variables used to capture political accountabil-
ity. These explanatory variables of interest are regrouped into “local political
accountability” and “global political accountability” variables.
The “local” part of political accountability indicates the state of governance within
the telecommunications sector and is captured in variables indicative of the political
5
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Variable Designation 
Regulation performance 
ml Mainline penetration 
cel Cellular subscription 
eff Mainlines per employee 
p_res Monthly subscription to fixed 
p_cel Price of cellular 
Local accountability
reg Regulatory governance
index 
Global accountability 
corruption Corruption 
bureau Bureaucracy 
law Law and order 
expropri Expropriation 
currency Currency risk 
institutional Institutional environment
index 
checks Checks and balances 
Other variables 
priva Privatisation 
comp_fix Competition in fixed 
comp_cel Competition in cellular 
rural Rural population 
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and financial independence of the regulator, the transparency of accounts and regu-
latory decisions, the clarity of the allocation of tasks among alternative regulatory
institutions, the nature of the legal environment and the degree of social participa-
tion in regulatory decisions. As to the “global” part of political accountability, it refers
to the state of governance in the economy as a whole. This is captured in variables
reflecting the quality of the institutional framework, namely government integrity,
efficiency of bureaucracy, strength of courts and enforcement capacity, government’s
commitment capacity, and currency risk, and the quality of the political process
inferred from the strength of checks and balances.
The second study seeking to investigate the determinants of sectoral reforms and
their impact on telecommunications infrastructure deployment, Gasmi and Recuero
Virto (2007) is based on a series of regressions performed with data collected on vari-
ables concerning 86 developing countries for the period 1985-1999.7 Table 2 below
gives the list of these variables and their designation.
6
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7 In this study again, the timespan of the sample was constrained by data availability.
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TABLE 2: LIST OF VARIABLES AND DESIGNATION (Gasmi and Recuero Virto, 2007)
Variable Designation 
Telecommunications deployment
ml Fixed-line deployment 
Telecommunications reforms
ac Cellular competition (analogue)
counter_ana Counter (analogue) 
dc Cellular competition (digital)
counter_dig Counter (digital)
lc Fixed-line competition (local)
r Separate regulator
p Privatisation
Institutional environment and risk indices
corruption Corruption
institutional Institutional index
democracy Democracy index
risk Risk index
Cost of public funds
debt Total debt service
tax Net taxes on products
aid Aid per capita
Other variables and instruments
density Population density
rural Rural population 
import Imports
staff Telecommunications staff
checks Checks and balances
english English legal origin
french French legal origin
protestant80 Share of protestant (1980)
latitude Latitude
school80 Average schooling years (1980)
ethno Ethnolinguistic fractionalisation
africa Africa
land Crop and forest land
polcon Political constraints
free_press Free press
ethnic Ethnic tensions
rule Law and order
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When running the regressions, a key point is to account for the endogeneity of
some right-hand-side variables, in particular, of the variable capturing infrastruc-
ture deployment when explaining the sectoral reform variable and of the reform
variable when explaining the infrastructure deployment variable. The reform vari-
able describes the reform instrument that has been implemented, namely, privati-
sation of the incumbent, introduction of competition in the fixed-service segment,
introduction of competition in the analogue and digital cellular segments (number
of granted licences), and creation of a separate regulator. The infrastructure
deployment variable used is the penetration rate of fixed service. Among the other
variables of the regressions, particular attention is given to those that measure the
quality of the institutional framework (all the variables described above except cur-
rency risk) and the ease of government access to public funds. The latter is
assessed through the marginal cost of public funds where parameters are set using
variables of debt service, taxation, and international aid.8 Finally, some additional
variables are used to control the effect of human capital availability in the sector,
state of democracy in the country, perceived country risk, and population density
and distribution in the country.
In these two studies, we apply two different econometric estimation methods
according to whether the dependent variable is continuous (regulatory perform-
ance/infrastructure deployment variables, privatisation variable) or discrete (vari-
ables of competition in the fixed, analogue cellular, and digital cellular segments, cre-
ation of a separate regulator). In the continuous case, we make use of the Differenced
and System Generalised Method of Moments which is appropriate for dealing with
dynamics and potential endogeneity of explanatory variables, two features of our
TSCS data. Arellano and Bond (1991), and Arellano and Bover (1995). In order to
avoid the weak instrument problem and more generally the risk of inaccurate results,
before performing the regressions, dependent variables are stationarised when there
is presence of unit roots in the series.
In the discrete case, we apply the Complementary Log Log estimator based on
the grouped duration methodology (Beck et al 1998). This methodology allows us
to deal with temporal dependence and multiple events as in the case of our cellu-
lar competition variables, since several licences were typically granted during the
period under study. Moreover, the problem of the potential endogeneity of the
explanatory regressors is first addressed by an exogeneity test based on the Two
Stage Conditional Maximum Likelihood Method and then, when needed, by an esti-
mator, the Full Information Maximum Likelihood, that allows for the presence of
endogenous regressors.
While the estimation of the coefficients of these (continuous/discrete) regres-
sions allows us to assess the quantitative impact of the explanatory variables on
the dependent variables, asking first whether there exists a causal relationship
between some series of interest allows us to interpret this impact meaningfully. We
test whether the variables that proxy political accountability “Granger-cause”
8
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8 The cost of public funds has been shown in the literature to be an important determinant of telecommunications policy
(Auriol and Picard, 2004, Gasmi et al, 1998, Warlters, 2004).
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those that proxy regulatory performance, and retain for our regressions only those
series where causality is found. Holtz-Eakin et al (1988). Moreover, we test
whether there is a two-way causal relationship between the variables used to
proxy sectoral reforms and those used that proxy infrastructure deployment, and
again retain only those where causality is found.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS
CAUSALITY
As mentioned in the previous section, before performing the econometric estimation
of the relationship between political accountability and regulatory performance on
the one hand, and reforms and network deployment on the other, we first investigate
the existence of causal relationships between the variables of interest.
For the data samples on 29 developing countries and 23 developed countries we
set up a Granger-causality testing procedure asking whether political accountability
causes regulatory performance. Table 3 below summarises the results of tests per-
formed. These tests support the proposition that, in both developing and developed
countries, there exists a causal relationship between political accountability and reg-
ulatory performance. This relationship is particularly apparent when the quality of
the institutional environment is the variable used to measure political accountability.
Another interesting feature of the results is that this causal relationship is stronger
for the global accountability variables, that is, those that reflect the governance of the
economy as a whole, than for the local accountability variables that reflect the gov-
ernance in the sector. This result is even more emphatic in the data sample on devel-
oping countries.
For the data on 86 developing countries, we investigate the existence of a two-way
Granger-causality between sectoral reforms (privatisation, competition, and creation
of a regulator) and infrastructure (penetration rate). Table 4 below summarises the
results of this investigation. Data shows evidence of both two-way and one-way
causality relationships. We find that the creation of a separate regulator impacts
fixed-line penetration but is also conditioned by it, a result also discussed by Ros
(2003) and Gutierrez (2003). A similar two-way causality relationship is found
between the variable that indicates the introduction of competition in the cellular dig-
ital segment and the one that measures fixed-line penetration. For the remaining
reform instruments, we find one-way causal relationships. Privatisation of the fixed-
line incumbent and introduction of competition in the analogue segment both cause
fixed-line deployment. Finally, deployment of fixed-line service causes the introduc-
tion of competition in the fixed local segment.
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TABLE 3: CAUSALITY RELATIONSHIPS (DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, DEVELOPED COUNTRIES)
(Gasmi et al 2006)
TABLE 4: CAUSAL RELATIONSHIPS (Gasmi and Recuero Virto, 2007)
ESTIMATION
The estimation results provide strong evidence that in developing countries, the
higher the political accountability the better the regulatory performance as reflected
in higher output (increase in fixed-line penetration and cellular subscription), higher
efficiency (increase in fixed lines per employee), or lower prices (decrease in price of
cellular).9 The results obtained from the data on the developed countries are much
more poorer. In fact, we find that a higher level of political accountability translates
into better regulatory performance only through higher output (increase in cellular
subscription) and lower prices (decrease in price of fixed-line subscription).
Our findings also suggest there are reasons to believe that local political
accountability is generally a relevant determinant of regulatory performance in
both developing and developed countries. The higher the sectoral regulatory gov-
ernance, the better the regulatory performance as reflected in the data from devel-
oping countries’ set through higher output (increase in fixed-line penetration) and
lower prices (decrease in price of fixed-line subscription and in price of cellular).
In the developed countries data set, the higher the sectoral regulatory governance
the better the regulatory performance as translated in higher output (increase in
cellular subscription).
The story is less clear when it comes to global accountability. In the data set on
developing countries, we found that the quality of the political process and the insti-
10
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Variable Local accountability Global accountability
reg institutional checks
ml (Yes, No) (Yes, Yes) (Yes, No)
cel (No, Yes) (Yes, Yes) (Yes, Yes)
eff (No, No) (Yes, No) (No, No)
p_res (Yes, Yes) (Yes, Yes) (Yes, No)
p_cel (Yes, No) (Yes, No) (Yes, No)
ac dc lc r n
reform  fixed-line deployment Yes Yes No Yes Yes
fixed-line deployment  reform No Yes Yes Yes No
9 The only result obtained that might at first seem counterintuitive is that higher political accountability (less risk of
expropriation for operators and stronger checks and balances) leads to a higher price of fixed-line subscription.
However, this might in fact only reflect the extent of tariff re-balancing that typically takes place in developing
countries during the early stages of the reforms.
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tutional environment have a favorable effect on regulatory performance when the lat-
ter is measured by any of the variables measuring output, price, and efficiency. In fact,
this effect is even stronger than for local political accountability. In contrast, with the
data set on developed countries the quality of the political process has only been
found to have a significant impact on regulatory performance when the latter is meas-
ured by output (increase in cellular subscription). Moreover, the quality of the insti-
tutional environment showed a positive effect on regulatory performance when the
latter is measured by price (decrease in price of fixed-line subscription) but an
ambiguous effect when regulatory performance is measured by output. Table 5 below
summarises this discussion.
TABLE 5: IMPACT OF POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY ON REGULATORY PERFORMANCE
(DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, DEVELOPED COUNTRIES) (Gasmi et al 2006)
Tables 6 and 7 below summarise the estimated results of the relationship between
reforms and network expansion. The regressions support the proposition that the
current level of infrastructure deployment is a relevant determinant of sectoral
reforms. More specifically, the higher the current fixed-line penetration, the more
likely competition will previal in the cellular digital and the local fixed-line segments
is to prevail and the less likely a separate regulator is to be created.10 We can infer
then that the government is more likely to introduce competition in the cellular digi-
tal and local fixed-line segments when the sector is performing relatively well (as indi-
cated by relatively high penetration rates) since under these circumstances higher
licence fees can be imposed. The creation of a separate regulator, however, seems to
be a means to improve the performance of a weak sector.
Variable Local accountability Global accountability
reg institutional checks
ml (+, NA) (NS, -) (+, NA)
cel (NA,+) (+, NS) (+, +)
eff (NA, NA) (+, NA) (NA, NA)
p_res (-, NS) (+, -) (+, NA)
p_cel (-, NA) (-, NA) (NA, NA)
Note: NA and NS stand for “not applicable” and “not significant” respectively
10 These results are in line with Evans et al (2005) who suggest that regulatory independence becomes more necessary
when returns on investment are expected to be high as is likely to be the case when fixed-line penetration is still
low.
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TABLE 6: SUMMARY OF RESULTS: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN REFORMS AND FIXED-LINE DEPLOYMENT.
Gasmi and Recuero Virto, (2007)
We also find that institutional quality is an important determinant of reforms. On
the one hand, the weaker the institutional environment, the less it is likely to find
reforms such as cellular competition in the analogue segment and the creation of a
separate regulator.11 On the other hand, the weaker the institutional environment, the
more likely it is to find privatisation of the fixed-line incumbent, cellular competition
in the digital segment, and fixed-line competition in the local segment.12 A possible
interpretation of the results is that the higher the expected price of the licence and,
in general, the greater the probability of attracting investors whose rents can be
imposed, the more likely a government with a poor institutional profile will be to pro-
mote the reforms.13
12
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ac dc lc r n
reform  fixed-line deployment - + NA NS +
fixed-line deployment  reform NA + + - NA
Note: NA and NS stand for “not applicable” and “not significant” respectively.
11 Taking the level of corruption as an indication of the level of the functioning of institution , this result is in line with
the hypothesis of Emerson (2006) that corruption should have a negative impact on the decision to introduce
competition.
12 The results support Laffont (2005) proposition that the probability of infrastructure privatisation should decrease
in countries with low or extreme levels of corruption.
13 Note that while the privatisation of the fixed-line incumbent and the introduction of competition in the digital cellular
and the fixed-line segments typically involve external investors, the first licence in the cellular analogue segment,
which often remains the sole licence issued in this segment, is usually granted to the fixed-line incumbent.
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TABLE 7: SUMMARY OF RESULTS: DETERMINANTS OF REFORMS Gasmi and Recuero (2007)
Through the variable parameters used, namely debt, taxes and aid, the cost of
public funds also appears to be a relevant determinant of sectoral reforms.14 On the
one hand, we find that the higher the cost of public funds, the more likely it is to see
privatisation of the fixed-line incumbent and cellular competition in the digital seg-
ment. On the other hand, the higher the cost of public funds, the less likely it is to have
cellular competition in the analogue segment and fixed-line competition. These
results lead us to conclude that more “profitable” reforms are likely to be selected
when the government is under tighter financial constraints.
Regarding the impact of sectoral reforms on the deployment of infrastructure,
we find strong evidence in our data set on the positive impact of privatisation of the
fixed-line incumbent on fixed-line penetration.15 Also, our separate treatment of the
analogue and digital segments allows us to shed some light on the effect of the
14 For a given tax system, increases in debt force the government to increase its revenue requirement through
increases in the tax level which in turn increases the cost of public funds. Changes in net taxes on products and aid
per capita have a direct impact on the government funding requirements and are expected to be negatively
correlated with the cost of public funds.
15 This result is in contrast with the literature which often reports an ambiguous impact of privatisation, and that is
mainly due to the fact that some authors are aggregating countries at very different stages of development.
ac dc lc r p
Risk index
Risk NA NA NA NA +
Cost of public funds
Total debt service NS + NS NA +
Net taxes on products + NS + NA - 
Aid per capita + - NS NA - 
Aggregated - + - NA +
Institutional environment indices
Corruption NS NS - NS NS 
Institutional index + - NS + -
Democracy index NS - NS NS +
Institutional index (square) NA NA NA NA +
Democracy index (square) NA NA NA NA NS
Discount factor
Checks and balances NA NA NA NS NA
Returns on investment
Fixed-line deployment NA + + - NA 
Note: NA and NS stand for “not applicable” and “not significant” respectively.
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introduction of competition in these two segments.16 While we do find that cellular
competition in the digital segment has a significant and positive impact on fixed-line
penetration, cellular competition in the analogue segment is found to have a signifi-
cant and negative impact on deployment. Therefore, fixed-line deployment and cellu-
lar competition in the digital segment can be viewed as complementary while fixed-
line deployment and cellular competition in the analogue segment can be regarded as
substitutes. This is consistent with the fact that analogue licences were granted
before digital licences and that they have been typically granted to the incumbent.
Hence, no strong competition can be expected between fixed and cellular analogue
services.17 Finally, the analysis of this 1985-1999 data did not show any significant
impact of fixed-line competition pn the local segment and on the creation of a regu-
lator on fixed-line penetration.18
CONCLUSION
The major point highlighted by this paper is the crucial role played by the institutional
and macroeconomic foundations that characterise a country in the development of infra-
structure industries. A no less major policy implication of this point is that the ongoing
debate on the (re)structuring of infrastructure industries that has so far taken place
mainly at a sectoral level should now be moving on to incorporating general factors of
the economy as a whole. The significance of these factors calls for a particularly subtle
attitude towards policy design in developing countries. On the one hand, this study has
emphasised that what we consider as a fundamental link between sectoral and economy-
wide institutions, namely, political accountability, has a positive direct impact on the per-
formance of regulation. On the other hand, a country’s institutional risk and financial
constraints have a positive indirect impact on the deployment of infrastructure, through
the sectoral reforms put in place by the government.
We find that political accountability, characterised through the quality of the insti-
tutional environment and the political process, is a relevant determinant of the per-
formance of regulation. The higher the political accountability, the better the regula-
tory performance. A consequence of this result is that future reforms should not only
devote attention to improving regulatory governance (structural requirements), but
should also pay much attention to understanding the political context within which
regulatory institutions will perform.
In developing countries, regulatory agencies have been strongly criticised since
the late ‘90s as often failing to prevent crises, or even worse, as contributing to their
development.19 Among the major criticisms has been their failure to retain private
investment.20 The discussion in this paper, however, suggests that the performance of
14
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16 The usual strategy in empirical studies is to use an aggregate index of competition for the analogue and digital
segments and the typical finding is a positive impact of competition on fixed-line penetration.
17 Capacity is also a constraint on analogue technology that limits the number of licences issued in contrast to digital
in which multiple providers often exist.
18 Although analysis of more recent data is needed for confirmation, these results might reflect lack of effective
competition and poor regulatory practices.
19 Some examples are the privatisation process in Ghana and Philippines and the competition process in Senegal.
20 According to the World Bank PPI database, investment rose from US$0.9 million in 1991 to US$44 million in 1997
and then decreased systematically (except in 2000) until its lowest level in 2004 at US$12 million.
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regulation should not be attributed only to sectoral features in developing countries
where political accountability is at an early stage of development. For these countries,
additional means and resources from development partners should be directed
towards promoting good global governance, which will in turn enhance regulatory
performance.21
Next to factors of this global nature, namely, the institutional environment and the
level of constraint of the government budget, infrastructure deployment has also been
discussed as an important determinant of sectoral reforms in developing countries.
In particular, in countries subject to higher institutional risk and to tighter financial
constraints, governments are more likely to promote those reforms that attract a
larger number of investors whose rents can be in turn extracted through the licence
price, red tape, or else, such as the privatisation of the fixed-line incumbent and the
introduction of cellular competition in the digital segment. For the same reasons,
these governments are less likely to support those reforms that are likely to provide
them with less cash, such as the introduction of competition in the analogue cellular
segment and the creation of a regulator.
As it turns out, the more economically attractive reforms promoted by these gov-
ernments are those that have a positive impact on infrastructure deployment. Over-
all, this leaves us with the result that might somehow seem paradoxical, that coun-
tries with poorer economic conditions and greater institutional risk are more likely
to support those sectoral reforms that enhance infrastructure deployment.22 This
might partly help in understanding the impressive growth of telecommunications
deployment in sub-Saharan Africa in the recent years. 
15
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21 In developed countries, as our results show, political accountability is already well established and practised
through an effective use by the electorate of its votes as a sanctioning tool. The focus therefore in those countries
is more on regulatory governance.
22 In Gasmi and Recuero Virto (2007), we find that both the privatization of the fixed-line incumbent and the
introduction of competition in the digital cellular segment have a positive impact on fixed-line deployment. These
same reforms are also found to be important drivers of cellular subscription growth as well.
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